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TOWARDS A NEW REGULATORY SYSTEM
Towards a New Regulatory System for
the Atmospheric Environment
Patricia Park!
Introduction
Anthropocentric emissions into the atmosphere have been problematic
for many years, whether those emissions cross jurisdictional
boundaries, create holes in the ozone layer or contribute to climate
change. How has the international community tried to address these
issues and what success has there been?
This is a particularly fast moving area of law and regulation and the
jury is still out on how successful the new regulatory system will be.
Will it develop further to include more sectors or will the vagaries of
'the market' prove too difficult to provide the policy objective of
protecting the atmosphere from anthropocentric activities? Issues of
equity and inter- and intra-generational justice also deserve a mention
when considering the common but differentiated responsibilities of
climate change. To illustrate some of the issues involved, a study of
the use of 'sinks' under the market-based flexible mechanisms of the
Kyoto Protocol produces some interesting answers to the questions
posed above.
Defining the Problem that the Law is Aiming to Address
Transboundary Air Pollution
The main sources of transboundary air pollution are sulphur dioxide
(S02) and nitrogen oxide (NOx), which are mainly produced
anthropocentrically by the combustion of fossil fuels for power
generation. Once emitted into the atmosphere, they are distributed by
the prevailing winds and deposited back onto the terrestrial
I Professor Patricia Park is Head of the Law Research Centre at Southampton Solent
University.
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environment. Scientific monitoring has shown that this deposition can
be thousands of miles away and in another jurisdiction from that
within which the emissions arose. It has also been noted that sulphur
and nitrogen can be deposited in dry form or as acid rain? This acid
deposition has been blamed for increased acidity of soil and fresh
water, which in tum has led to reduced crop growth and degradation
of forests, and the disappearance of both fish and wildlife. 3 In the
Trail Smelter arbitration, the panel had tried to address the problem of
transboundary pollution when it held that:
. .. no state has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or
to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.4
The evidential questions were resolved by scientific evidence and the
tribunal laid down a regime regulating the liability of states in
intemationallaw for harm caused in breach of obligations not to cause
harm by transboundary pollution. In other words, Canada was ordered
to adopt a regime for regulating the future operation of the smelter,
but the right to continue to operate was maintained. It also
emphasised that the compromis expressly empowered the tribunal to
prescribe measures.5 This created a balance of interests between the
two parties, which was achieved through the order of the tribunal and
led to the acceptance of negotiated settlements to achieve an equitable
solution, without weakening the underlying rules of intemational law
which structured their negotiations.6 This was a landmark case in
2 GESAMP, The State olthe Marine Environment (1990); 2"d International Conference on the
Protection of the North Sea, Quality Status ofthe North Sea (1987).
J UN/ECE, Air Pollution Studies, Nos 1-12 (1984-96).
4 35 AJ1L (1941), 716.
5 Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law, (1941) 35 AJIL 712 ff.
6 Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment. 2nd edn.
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which the principle was established that states may be held
accountable in interstate claims, and are required to take adequate
steps to control and regulate sources of serious global environmental
pollution or transboundary harm within their territory or subject to
their jurisdiction. It was an arbitral decision, then, that established the
need for a negotiated regime to protect one state from pollution
arising in another jurisdiction. This is a basic precept of an obligation
to prevent future harm rather than merely a basis for reparation after
the event, and has been carried forward in a number of judicial
decisions, a wide range of global and regional treaties, and in the
Stockholm and Rio Declarations.
Because the problem was most marked in Europe, by 1976 a
European monitoring programme had been put in place. This, in tum,
led to the adoption of the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, which remains the only major regional
multilateral agreement, devoted to the regulation of transboundary air
pollution. It also enables the European states to treat their air-mass as
a shared resource and, so, impose common pollution control methods
and emission standards. As we shall see, Europe is considered in the
same way under the Kyoto Protocol.
The Depletion of the Ozone Layer
Increasing scientific certainty that particular substances,7 generally
known as ozone depleting substances (ODS), were damaging the
ozone layer provided the international community with the impetus to
take more positive action in the form of the Convention for the
Protection ofthe Ozone Layer 1985. 8 However, the 1985 Convention,
signed at Vienna, was merely a framework convention as many
parties remained uncertain about the true effects of certain chemicals
on the ozone layer. The Convention itself is largely an empty
framework which merely requires state parties to agree to take further
action rather than establishing any targets or timetables for the
J Chlorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluocarbons, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform.
8 261LM 1529 (1985)
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phasing out of the ODS. It encourages parties to co-operate and
exchange information in order to better understand and assess the
effects of human activities on the ozone layer.9 Although a Secretariat
was set up to receive all the information gathered, it was just that, an
information gathering exercise to assess the causes and effects of
ozone depletion. Nevertheless, these provisions laid the basis for
ensuring adequate monitoring and research, and for making substitute
technologies and substances available to, in particular, developing
countries.
By 1987 the scientific evidence was much more convincing with the
hole in the ozone layer becoming larger at an alarming rate. The
scientists involved planned to hold their conference in Montreal the
week before the states parties to the convention were due to meet, and
stayed on to demonstrate their scientific models to the politicians,
who were then sufficiently convinced that they agreed the Montreal
Protocol to the Convention.
The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer was a much more significant agreement than the Convention
itself inasmuch as it sets out firm targets for reducing and eventually
eliminating both production and usage of a range of ozone-depleting
substances. This was an innovative use of command and control at the
international level. It was decided that it would be easier to control,
firstly, the production of CFCs because not many industries actually
produce the substances but a large number use them. However, to
control production without restricting consumption may create an
illegal market,1O and, so, recycled and reused substances were not to
be considered as production. 1! The Montreal Protocol then regulated
both CFCs and halons,12 with further substances put under regulatory
9 Art 2(2).
10 Edith Brown Weiss, 'The Five International Treaties: a Living History' in Strengthening
Compliance with International Environmental Accords (1989).
II Art 1(6).
12 Arts 2A & 2B.
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control, and a schedule was put in place for the acceleration of the
elimination of these substances.
The Protocol has been amended on numerous occasions, which have
had the effect of tightening the procedures for trade in recycled
substances, with this licensing system being incorporated into the
1997 amendments to the Protocol. 13 Because there is also a non-
compliance procedure which incorporates both a 'carrot' and a
'stick,14, the control of the production and use of ODS had a
beneficial effect on the hole in the ozone layer, which began to heal
itself. However, the current issue is how the Protocol will be
implemented by developing countries that must begin their phase-out
of CFCs, halons, and carbon tetrachloride. Asian countries have
actually increased their CFC consumption as a result of a high rate of
economic growth and their dependence on CFC products will increase
future demand. IS If these developing countries do not comply, then
the regime, based on the Montreal Protocol, will collapse and the
migration of CFC-intensive industries to less regulated countries will
reduce the benefits of the Protocol. 16
Climate Change
When addressing climate change the challenge is that, to control
production of a substance or group of substances from one section of
industrial production under command and control, is an entirely
different matter from legislating to stabilise various emissions known
as Green House Gases (GHGs) from a large number of different
sources, which affect climate change.
Although the scientific issues surrounding climate change had been
known for over a hundred years, it was not until the late twentieth
" Decision VII/9: Basic Domestic Needs, Seventh Meeting of the Parties, 5-7 Dec 1995.
14 Annex V to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
15 UNEP, Ozone Secretariat, http://www.unep.org/ozone.
16 Bial et ai, Public Choice Issues in International Collective Action: Global Warming
Regulation, http://www.ssm.com
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century that climate change emerged onto the international political
agenda when in 1988 the UN General Assembly took up the issue for
the first time and adopted Resolution 43/53. The Resolution declared
that climate change was a 'common concern of mankind'. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) had been
established that year by the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
which jointly set up the panel with a mandate to assess the emerging
science of climate change and subject it to intergovernmental
scrutiny. The latest set of principles governing its work!7 state that it
is to:
... assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and
transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-
economic information relevant to understanding the risk of
human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and
options for adaptation and mitigation.
The IPPC does not, in fact, carry out scientific research itself but,
rather, it conducts a massive review of climate change research which
has been published in peer reviewed journals by government bodies,
universities, intergovernmental organisations and individual
researchers from around the world. What the IPCC provides is an
objective analysis in order that policy-makers can make informed
decisions. Although the need for a Framework Convention on Climate
Change was agreed in 1990 at the World Summit in Rio de Janeiro, it
was not until the third Conference of the Parties when they met in
Kyoto that a new regulatory structure was devised, which included a
number of flexible market mechanisms.
The objective of the Convention was the 'stabilisation of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system'. This
objective is framed in terms of an environmental quality standard
inasmuch as it establishes an environmental threshold which Parties
must not exceed. However, the threshold that is established
17 IPPC, 1998, para 2.
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(dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system) does
allow activities which cause such interference up to this point. Article
2 of the Convention goes on to provide additional guidance
concerning the timing of any actions to stay within the threshold. 18
The objective, therefore, has a precautionary emphasis. This
preventative focus of the objective also applies to the Kyoto Protocol
as the Convention states that 'any related instrument' shall share the
ultimate objective, set out in Article 2. This is also affirmed in
paragraph 2 of the Preamble of the Protocol. 19
The Kyoto Protocol recognised that the costs of climate change and
any adaptation to mitigate its impacts are unknown. In fact the biggest
factor influencing Annex I Parties' compliance cost is the geographic
availability of mitigation measures. However, the principle that groups
of Parties with differential compliance costs could co-operate in
implementing mitigation measures was accepted in the Convention.20
The Protocol provided further clarity on this by including the three
innovative mechanisms allowing Annex I Parties to achieve their
Article 3.1 mitigation commitments by undertaking, financing or
purchasing emissions reductions, generated overseas?1 The inclusion
of these flexible mechanisms enabled countries to commit to more
environmentally stringent targets at Kyoto than they would normally
have been inclined to do. However, their implementation in an
international context on so large a scale was unprecedented and raised
novel moral, equity and environmental considerations.22 Many
European and developing countries were, and remain, morally
concerned by the concept that the most polluting countries can 'buy'
their way out of taking any kind of domestic action. Others are
concerned that emissions trading may entrench existing inequalities by
18 Art 2: ' ... such a level should be achieved within a timeframe sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change ... '.
19 Sands. Principles ofInternational Environmental Law, second edition.
20 FCCC Art 3.3, and Art 4.2 (a) and (d).
21 Yamin and Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime (2004).
22 Yamin. 'Joint Implementation', (2000) 10(1) Global Environmental Change.
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endorsing the 'right to emit' of those who were historically
responsible for creating the problem by emitting the greatest share of
GHGs whilst shifting the burden of pollution control to those who
have contributed little. Environmental concerns were expressed at the
lack of more stringent Kyoto targets for the Russian Federation and
Ukraine, whose most polluting industries had collapsed, and the fact
that these countries might sell their surplus allowances.23 These
surplus allowances, which were based on historic emission levels and
bore no relation to climate mitigation policies, were known as 'hot air'
and could be used by richer countries to avoid making politically
unpopular domestic reductions. However, in response to these moral
and equity concerns, the Marrakesh Accords24 state that the 'Kyoto
Protocol has not created or bestowed any right, title or entitlement to
emissions of any kind on Parties included in Annex l' .25 Further,
prioritising domestic action, which has both moral and environmental
dimensions, was one of the most divisive elements of post-Kyoto
negotiations. However, the Marrakesh Accords provide that 'use of
the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic actions and
domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort
made'. However, there is no definition of the word 'significant' but
Annex I Parties must submit information in accordance with Article 7,
which will be reviewed under Article 8. A further report must be
submitted on how each Annex I Party is making 'demonstrable
progress' under Article 3.2 of the Protocol. In addition, the rules
limiting banking constrains the use of the Kyoto mechanisms and
could serve to create more incentives for domestic action.
Use of the Flexible Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol
The heart of the climate change regime is the mitigation commitments
by certain Parties. The mitigation commitments, which are applicable
to all Parties, are provided for in Article 4.1 of the Convention and
these are known as 'general commitments' as they cover a broad range
2J Yamin and Depledge, op cit.
24 Cop 7. fccc/CP/2001/13 Marrakesh.
25 Decision 15/CP.7, Preamble, paragraph 5.
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of issues relevant to addressing climate change. These include
planning, research and adaptation. Annex I Parties have more stringent
mitigation commitments, which are identified in Article 4.2 of the
Convention and are often known as 'specific commitments'. Articles
4.3 to 4.10 contain commitments relating to specific situations
concerning particular groups of countries or Parties. These special
situations of various Parties are incorporated into various provisions of
the Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords. It is these legally binding
mitigation commitments which are linked to almost every aspect of
the climate change regime, and both the Convention and the Protocol
allow groups of Parties to fulfil these mitigation commitments jointly.
Also Annex I Parties may make use of Kyoto Protocol flexible
mechanisms to meet their Article 3 commitments.
The eligibility of Annex I Parties to use the flexible mechanisms is
overseen by the Enforcement branch of the Compliance Committee26
and any determination by the Enforcement Branch of non-eligibility
would lead automatically to the suspension of eligibility to use the
flexible mechanisms by the Party concerned.27 The consequence of
ineligibility is that the relevant Annex I Party, and any legal entities,
authorised by them, cannot undertake transactions dealing with Kyoto
units. Decision 24/CP.7 provides that the suspension 'is to be in
accordance with the relevant provisions' under Article 6, 12 and 17.
Therefore, if an Annex I Party is not eligible to deal with units under
one flexible mechanism, they may fulfil the criteria for eligibility
under one of the other mechanisms. However, if an Annex I Party is
suspended from eligibility for Emissions Trading, it would appear that
no transactions relating to any of the flexible mechanisms units can be
completed until the eligibility criteria are fulfilled. The effects of
being barred from the use of any of the flexible mechanisms would be
very significant for any Annex I Party which placed a high reliance on
the use of these mechanisms to achieve their Article I commitments.
In Decision I5/CP, 7, Annex, paragraph 8, all Parties agreed that:
26 Decision 24/CP.7.
27 Decision 24/CP.7, Annex, section XV, para 4.
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... environmental integrity is to be achieved through sound
modalities, rules and guidelines for the mechanisms, sound
and strong principles and rules governing land use, land
use change and forestry activities and a strong compliance
regIme.
However, unresolved differences concerning the binding nature of the
compliance procedures meant that a number of countries were
unwilling to agree that acceptance of the compliance procedures was
to be a condition of eligibility to use the flexible mechanisms. The
final wording agreed at Marrakesh is as follows:
The eligibility to participate in the mechanisms by a Party
included in Annex I shall be dependent on its compliance
with methodological and reporting requirements under
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 and Articles 7.1 and 7.4 of the
protocol. Oversight of these provisions will be provided by
the enforcement branch of the compliance committee, in
accordance with the procedures and mechanisms relating
to compliance as contained in decision 24/CP.7, assuming
approval of such procedures and mechanisms by the
[COP/MOP] in decision form in addition to any
amendment entailing legally binding consequences, noting
that it is the prerogative of the [COP/MOP] to decide on
the legal form of the procedures and mechanisms to
compliance.
However, this final wording was not intended to undermine or
prejudice the oversight of eligibility conditions by the Enforcement
Branch as all Parties agreed that such oversight is necessary.
29
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The Flexible Mechanisms
Emissions Trading
The concept of emissions trading was first proposed as a general
mechanism for pollution policy by Tientenberg in 1985,28 and was
also introduced by Grubb in 1989?9 These publications influenced the
incorporation of emissions trading into the Framework Convention on
Climate Change. However, there was a sharp difference of view on
such trading. Advocates in favour claimed that it would create
improved cost-effectiveness, pointing out that there was wide disparity
between countries of the costs of reducing emissions, and the least
expensive route would be to implement the least costly options for
reduction, no matter where they took place geographically.
Opponents argued, inter alia, that such arrangements would reduce the
incentive for producer countries to take action domestically and
compromise the sovereignty of the host nation. A further objection
raised was the highly political issue of the initial allocation of
permits.30 This disagreement led to the terminology of joint
implementation to be used as enabling language in the original
convention, but allowing for the future development of emission
trading later on under the provisions at Kyoto. It is now accepted that
joint implementation and emissions trading refer to different
mechanisms, but it is accepted that there are similarities between
them. 31
It is Article 17 of the Convention that provides foremissions trading
between Kyoto Protocol Annex B countries32 to participate in trading
28 Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy (Resources for
the Future, 1985).
29 Grubb, Negotiating Targets ( Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1989).
30 Jackson et aI, International Journal ofEnvironment and Pollution (special issue, 1998).
31 Woerdmann, 'Implementing the Kyoto Protocol: why JI & COM show more promise than
international emissions trading', Energy Policy, vol 28( I).
32 These countries have binding targets under the Protocol.
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schemes according to the rules, principles and modalities set down.
However, Article 17 also reiterates the concept of supplementarity of
emissions trading with respect to domestic action. The Parties have
assigned amounts of units and, subject to all the Marrakesh rules, will
be permitted to transfer and acquire units from each other to fulfil their
Article 3.1 commitments?3 This cap and trade scheme was suggested
by the USA as a means to achieve an environmental benefit.34
Amongst the difficulties associated with the concept of emissions
trading was the process of initial allocation of permits, which some
considered would result in the so-called 'hot air' problem.35 This
would be created by western nations attempting to buy emission
reduction credits from some Eastern European nations, whose industry
had collapsed and, so, had a surfeit of allowances available. Thus, any
transactions in emission reduction credits would be devoid of
environmental benefit. Woerdmann has argued that this problem
would be significant enough to devalue the potential for emissions
trading and he favoured the project-based joint implementation
mechanisms, provided for under Articles 6 and 12?6 Further problems
identified are questions of supplementarity, the problem of ensuring
that equity is maintained, and issues of transparency, liability and
compatibility.3? Notwithstanding these difficulties, the European
Commission backed a proposal by Denmark to create a European
Emissions Trading Scheme.
33 Decision 18/CP.7, Annex, para 2.
34 FCCC/TP/200012, pp82-86.
35 Woerdmann, op cit.
36 Ibid.
37 UN FCCC (1998) Report of the CO'?ference of the Parties on its Fourth Session. part 2,
Decision I/CPA.
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The European Emissions Trading Scheme38
The European Community participates in the Convention as a regional
economic organisation under Article 22 and the Kyoto Protocol,
Article 24, and is the only such Party to the Convention. In its
declarations made on ratification of both the Convention and the
Protocol, the EU had to confirm that it would fulfil its commitments
jointly, together with its member states. When ratifying the Protocol,
the EU submitted a copy of an agreement, reached by the Community
and its member states, regarding the joint fulfilment of the emission
targets under Article 4.39
The European Emissions Trading Scheme is the first mandatory
international trading system for greenhouse gas emissions in the world
and regulates approximately 11,400 installations throughout the EU. It
is ten times the size of the Acid Rain trading programme, established
in the USA under the Clean Air Act Amendments 1991. Its design
tried to take advantage of many lessons learned from existing
experience with trading programmes, in particular, the RECLAIM
programme in California. It was also based on economic theory and is
innovative in a number of important ways. However, in the published
works prior to the implementation concern was expressed with regard
to equity, enforcement and, in particular, efficiency. A lack of data
and the prospect of some Member States of the European Union,
which had a less robust environmental regulatory regime, raised
particular concerns about both allocation of allowances, compliance
and enforcement. Much attention was focused on whether prices
would be too low in the first phase of the programme, and the fact that
external events could create a volatile market.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
The COM allows Annex I countries to implement projects that reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases and contribute to sustainable
3X See Roggenkamp and Hammer (eds), European Energy Law Report, Tnsentia 2005.
39 FCCCICP/2002/2, Agreement between the European Community and its member states
under Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol.
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development in the territory of developing countries. These projects
are then credited with 'Certified Emission Reductions' (CERs). The
COM is provided for in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol as a means
for companies to undertake projects in countries without a Kyoto
target (non-Annex T countries). They may be used by Annex I
countries for compliance either by Governments retiring them to help
meet the countries ' Kyoto targets, or by companies surrendering them
to help meet their allocations under the ED ETS.
Advocates claim that for some countries this flexible mechanism is
important because of the possible attraction of foreign investment;
however, critics point out that the Annex 1 countries can avoid
reduction responsibilities within their own state, while using credits
earned through the COM scheme to emit more. Furthermore, the use
of the COM mechanism may lead to further dependency by the
developing nations rather than true sustainable development, based on
technology transfer.40 To avoid this problem, Article 12.5 provides
that COM projects can only be certified on the basis that real,
measurable and long term benefits, related to the mitigation of climate
change and reductions, are additional to any that would occur in the
absence of the certified project. However, although these projects
must be verified, problems have been identified with regard to the
operation of the COM system.41 Annex 1 companies are receiving
COM credits for supporting projects in developing countries, which
would have gone ahead with environmental technology installed
anyway, without the additional finance produced by the COM
scheme.42 Although many COM schemes will be of benefit to
developing countries, the verification process must be robust in order
to gain public respect and support, otherwise major companies will get
rich without benefit to either the developing countries or the
environment.
40 Gupta, Kazi and Cheatle, 'Newest Biggest Deal', Down To Earth, November 15.2005.
41 Truth about Kyoto: huge profits, little carbon saved (The Guardian. Saturday. 2 June
2007). p 6.
42 Bretton Woods Project, World Bank's Carbon trading plansfail Africa, 2 July 2007.
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Joint Implementation
Joint Implementation (11) is provided for in Article 6 of the Kyoto
protocol as a means for companies to undertake projects in countries
with a Kyoto target, which reduce their emissions of greenhouse
gases. Joint Implementation amongst Annex 1 countries may result in
either abatement or sequestration for the purposes of meeting their
Article 3.1 commitments. These projects are then credited with
'Emission Reduction Units' (ERUs) which can then be used for
compliance either by Governments retiring them to help meet the state
Kyoto targets, or by the companies surrendering them to help meet
their allocations under the EU ETS. The Bonn Agreement provided
limited guidance on how to institutionalise 11 but negotiations on
Decision 16/CP.7 interpreted the Bonn guidance to establish two
tracks for JI. Under Track 1, if the state that grants the ERU meets all
the eligibility requirements,43 then the state can issue the ERU without
further complication. Whereas under Track 2, if the state that grants
the ERU does not meet the eligibility requirements, then the ERUs
granted must be monitored by the Supervisory Committee, established
under Article 6.44
Like the COM, Joint Implementation is not a priority for the UK
Government and the UK's Designated Focal Point for JI is not
currently approving 11 projects in the UK, but can issue letters of
approval to UK companies wishing to participate in 11 projects abroad.
Environmental and Social Impacts of Flexible Mechanisms
It is worth noting that the convention does not limit its concerns to
climate change but states in Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol that
parties are required to implement their commitments in such a way
that minimizes any adverse social, environmental and economic
43 The requirements of ratification and reporting.
44 Decision 16/CP.7, Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol,
FCCC/CP/200I/I3/Add.2, section II, 2001.
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impacts. This principle is also reinforced by Article 12.2, which
provides for CDM projects to assist developing countries to achieve
sustainable development. In fact any project is likely to have
environmental and social impacts which may extend far beyond the
immediate project area, eg clearing the site during the development
stage, transport movements, employment and also employment
displacement. The creation of an infrastructure of roads for access will
have an impact on the environment and, so, initial environmental and
social impact assessments are vital in order to be in compliance with
Article 3.
Study of the possible use of 'Sinks' on the UK Continental Shelf.
Article 6 provides for the permitted use of 'sinks'.45 However, Article
6 projects, aimed at enhancing anthropogenic removal of GHGs, must
conform to the definitions rules and guidelines under Article 3. In
addition, Decision 19/CP.7 governs the issuing of removal units
(RMUs) in Annex I countries.
According to the Stem Report,46 'extensive carbon capture and
storage would allow ... continued use of fossil fuels without damage
to the atmosphere.' What happens is that carbon dioxide, produced in
coal-fired power stations, would be captured, treated, and then
transported out to the continental shelf for disposal or storage in
depleted oil or gas wells or in geological formations under the sea,
which were deemed to be appropriate and which qualify as 'sinks'
under the Protocol. However, in respect of carbon storage on the
continental shelf, the oil and gas companies would need some form of
commercial incentive to encourage them to participate, but any
incentives must be in compliance with the European State aid rules. A
further suggestion is that allowances under the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme are auctioned and the revenue hypothecated to support the
45 Kyoto Protocol Article 3 and Article 6, which provides for sinks to be used under Joint
Implementation.
46 The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_review.
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EU policy objectives of the use of renewable energy sources and
clean coal technology, including carbon capture and sequestration.
Policy Background
The European Union (EU) is now committed to achieving a reduction
in its CO2 emissions of 20% relative to 1990 levels by 2020. However,
these reductions will have to be made without the benefits of the one-
off factors that largely explain the actual reduction in emissions
projected to be achieved by the EU over 1990-20IO. These were the
'dash for gas' in the UK in the early 1990s47 and the severe recession
in Eastern Europe over the same period. In the absence of these one-
off factors the EU will either have to improve its domestic abatement
performance significantly over 2010-20, or face the prospect of
achieving an even higher proportion of its 2020 target via the purchase
of allowance credits.
Given that power production is responsible for over 29% of global
carbon dioxide (C02) emissions - CO2 being the main greenhouse gas
(GHG) - and that, in the UK, about 70% of electricity comes from
fossil fuel generation,48 it is a key challenge for energy policy, both in
the UK and internationally, to mitigate the impact of power
generation based on fossil fuels. One of the main reasons why the
growth in global GHG emissions is accelerating so rapidly is that the
developing world is having to generate ever more electricity to meet
the growing energy demand, associated with its population growth
and economic development. In the largest developing countries of
India and China much of this extra power generated is based on coal.
However vital it is to increase the share of power production from
renewable sources, the reality is that conventional fossil fuels remain
the most widely and cheaply available source of producing electricity.
47 Park, Energy Law and the Environment (Taylor and Francis, 2002).
48 DEFRA, Key Facts about Climate Change Emissions of Greenhouse Gases (2006),
http://www.defra.gov.uklenvironment/statistics/globatmos/kf/gakfo5.htm.
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According to the Stem Report: 49
Extensive carbon capture and storage would allow this
continued use of fossil fuels without damage to the
atmosphere, and also guard against the danger of strong
climate change policy being undermined at some stage by
falls in fossil fuel prices.
Throughout his report Stem is arguing for the accelerated deployment
of a portfolio of zero-carbon energy technologies, within which both
renewables and carbon capture and storage will have a role to play.
An expansion of renewables will be necessary but will not be
sufficient to achieve the required emission reductions by 2050.
Therefore, an aggressive acceleration of clean-coal technology,
including CCS, is also imperative.
This idea is also reflected in the UK Government's energy policy
goals set out in the 2003 Energy White Paper (EWP), which states that
the UK needs to cut its CO2 emissions by some 60% by about 2050,
with real progress by 2020, to maintain the reliability of energy
supplies, to promote competitive markets in the UK and beyond,
helping to raise the rate of sustainable economic growth and improve
UK productivity, and to ensure every home is adequately and
affordably heated. These twin pillars of climate change and security of
supply can be both conflicting and complementary. It was security of
supply that took priority after the 2006 winter, when some gas-
producer countries were making less than favourable comments
towards the Member states of the European Union, amongst others.
Sam Laidlaw50 stated that there would be no opportunity for a green
agenda if the lights went out. He also noted that in power generation
the Government was relying on the market to deliver and in the long
term, with a robust carbon price, companies would be looking to
hedge their commodity risk by building a variety of power stations
which used different feed stock, including clean coal and carbon
49 The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independentJeview.
50 Chief Executive of Centrica. Energy Institute Summer Lunch, 4 July 2007.
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capture and storage (CCS). For this to happen the price of carbon is
critical and this in tum depends on a robust and effective European
Emissions Trading Scheme.
The energy policy framework, within which these goals are pursued,
combines competition, where it is desirable, and regulation, when it is
necessary. Specific investment decisions under that framework are
made by energy companies and by business more generally.
Government's role is to ensure that the right framework is in place
and, in terms of environmental protection, to ensure that carbon
emissions reductions are delivered in the most cost-effective way. An
important contribution to the UK Government's energy policy
objectives is the concept of carbon dioxide capture from coal-fired
power stations and its sequestration beneath the continental shelf for
either storage or disposal.
Carbon Capture and Storage on the North Sea Continental Shelf
and the Law
Carbon dioxide would be captured at large stationary point sources
such as fossil-fuel fired power stations, liquefied and transported,
usually by pipeline, to a storage site (in this case beneath the
continental shelf). It would then be pumped down a well into an
underground reservoir rock. Here it would be held in place by natural
geological seals that prevent it moving out of the storage site. 51
International Law
As we have seen, The Framework Convention on Climate Change52
was signed in 1992 and was consequent upon agreement at the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Provisions include obligations by
contracting parties to formulate, implement and publish national and
regional programmes designed to mitigate climate change and climate
51 Holloway et at, 'Underground Storage of Carbon Dioxide', in Shackley and Gough (eds),
Carbon Capture and Its Storage (Ashgate, 2006).
52 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992).
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change effects,53 to promote the transfer of technologl4 and to
promote the development of sinks.55 Article 4(2) has been interpreted
by some to include specific commitments on sources and sinks.56
However, Article 4(2) only applies to the developed countries, as
described in Annex I to the Convention, and focuses on net emissions
by source minus the removal by sinks.57
The London Dumping Convention 1972 mainly applies to the water
column rather than any sub-sea activity but the 1996 Protocol, which
came into force on 24 March 2006, represents a major change of
approach to the question of how to regulate the use of the sea as a
depository for waste materials, inasmuch as it introduces a general
prohibition on dumping of waste materials except for materials on an
approved list. Problematically, carbon dioxide was not on the original
approved list. However, at the first meeting under the Protocol in
November 2006, clarification and amendments to facilitate and/or
regulate the sequestration of CO2 were made. This followed a prior
meeting of the Legal Working Group, held at the IMO on 10 April -
12, which discussed the compatibility of CO2 capture and storage in
sub-seabed structures after the Technical Working Party meeting on 3
-7 April.
The Protocol does not include pipeline discharges from land,
operational discharges from vessels or offshore installations or
placement for a purpose other than disposal (usually accepted to mean
Enhanced Oil Recovery EaR). However, carbon storage could be
considered 'a placement for a purpose other than disposal'. If carbon
dioxide is 'stored' then this would be acceptable under the original
Protocol. However, the operator would need to show that he will
extract the CO2 at a later date for other uses such as EaR. The
53 Art 4(1)(b).
54 Art 4(1)(c).
55 Art 4( 1)(d).
56 Art 4(2)(a).
57 Arts 3(3), 4( 1)(b) and 4(2)(c).
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Protocol also contains a stricter precautionary approach than the 1972
Convention as it requires its Contracting Parties to apply the
Precautionary Principle (Resolution LDC 44(14) 1991) instead of
being 'guided by' it. CO2 is likely to fall within its scope because it
applies to the introduction into the marine environment of 'wastes or
other matter'. However, the test is 'whether it is more likely than not
to cause damage to the marine environment'. In their experience the
Norwegians (Norwegian Research Council Project No 151393/210)
consider that underground sequestration in large amounts may, but is
unlikely to, cause some damage 'locally' to the atmosphere, which is
covered by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
1982. But, if the sequestration is injected into a geological structure in
the subsoil in such a manner that it is unlikely to escape, such an
injection would pass the 'likely' test. Given that oil companies have
been using this operation for the purposes of EOR for over a decade,
it is expected that 'good oilfield practice' should suffice.
The OSPAR Convention was not drafted with carbon storage in mind
and in 2004 the Jurists and Linguists Group of OSPAR accepted an
amendment to consider the subject. The placement of CO2 arising
from operations of offshore installations is not prohibited but is
regulated as a placement for scientific research. The Convention does
not distinguish between ocean storage and subsoil storage; therefore,
if it does not cause 'pollution', there is no prohibition under Annexes
I, II & Ill. However, the precautionary principle must be considered
for any substance introduced 'directly or indirectly' into the marine
environment. To this end the Commission took decisive action at their
meeting in Ostend in 2007, by adopting amendments to the Annexes
to the Convention to allow the storage of CO2 in geological
formations under the seabed. They also adopted a decision to ensure
environmentally safe storage of CO2 streams in geological formations
and OSPAR Guidelines for Risk Assessment and Management of the
activity. The Commission also adopted a Decision to legally rule out
placement of CO2 into the water-column of the sea and on the sea-
bed, because of any potential negative effects. This recognises CCS as
a pragmatic approach as a bundle of measures to reduce the amount of
CO2 escaping into the atmosphere, with the Commission producing
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guidelines to manage the process. Following these Decisions, it IS
expected that further guidance on the selection of suitable depleted oil
and gas fields and deep saline formations may be forthcoming.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
(UNCLOS III) is the most significant international convention
regarding the marine environment. Although the Convention came
into force in 1994, it was not until 1997 that the UK ratified the
Convention and the USA is yet to do so. The Convention aims to
govern all aspects of the marine environment including delimitation,
environmental control, marine scientific research and economic and
commercial activity, but the most important of these is delimitation.
Under the Convention different areas of jurisdiction are subject to
different powers and duties of the coastal state. Historically, areas of
delimitation for territorial waters and the continental shelf had been
subject to separate treaties but the 1982 Convention codified and
consolidated previous case law and legislation. Unique to the 1982
Convention was the introduction of the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), which extended the coastal state jurisdiction out from the
territorial sea to 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline.58
Although most maritime lawyers would recognise that the EEZ
includes both the territorial seas and the continental shelf, care should
be taken as each area of delimitation enjoys subtly different rights and
obligations. Under the Convention the coastal state has the right to
license certain activities, including those of exploration and
exploitation of natural resources both under the sea-bed and in the
column of water above. However, when exercising these rights, the
coastal state does have a duty to consider all users of the marine
environment, the rights and duties of other states and not to cause
pollution to the territory of other states or areas beyond their national
jurisdiction.59 This duty becomes particularly important when
considering the long term sequestration of CO2 under the sea-bed, and
the possibility of any leakage. Should the coastal state license the
sequestration of CO2 within their EEZ (if an EEZ had been claimed
58 Arts 55-57.
59 Art 194(2).
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and registered by that state) and in accordance with their national
legislation, they may also authorise the pipelines to transport the
liquid CO2 out to the marine site. As carbon sequestration for storage
purposes is relatively new, as opposed to the use of gas for enhanced
oil recovery, then the coastal state may also authorise research and
development within their jurisdiction, which would include trials for
CCS. In narrower marine areas, then, the continental shelf and any
200 nautical mile EEZ could well over-lap and the relevant coastal
states would need to come to a bi-Iateral, or more, agreement on
where to authorise any sequestration of CO2, and any degree of
liability associated with the long term storage and possible leakage.
As technology develops for deeper sea exploration and exploitation,
the possibility of use of the sub-sea for CCS will become more
relevant. The area beyond any EEZ remains part of the high seas, with
its associated freedoms for all to use, but the 1982 UNCLOS declared
the high seas to be the 'common heritage of mankind' and the seabed
was described as 'the area' under Part XI of the Convention.6D Part XI
also introduces a new'Authority,61, which was set up by Resolution I
of UNCLOS III for the establishment of the International Sea Bed
Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
However, Part XI of the Convention only refers to 'activities in the
Area' as meaning 'all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of,
the resourcel2 of the Area,.63 Therefore, unless it could be argued
that a particular geological formation of the sea bed within the Area,
which would permit carbon sequestration, is a 'resource', then it
would appear that carbon sequestration will not be governed by the
Deep Sea Bed Authority.
60 Part XI, Art I(I). 'Area' means the seabed and ocean tloor and subsoil thereot: beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
61 Part XI, Art 1(2). 'Authority' means the International Seabed Authority.
62 Authors emphasis.
61 Part XI, Art 1(3).
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Under European Community Legislation
Under the European Union framework a number of Directives could
possibly apply. However, the Netherlands legal taskforce reported on
the subject in 2001 and concluded that, although CO2 falls under the
Framework Directive on Waste, it did not apply as CO2 was not a
dangerous substance. They also concluded that injection of CO2 in the
deep underground does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Directive
on Dumping of Waste Materials. However, following the recognition
by the Commission in its Communication of 12 January 200764 that
coal is a key contributor to the EU's security of energy supply and
will remain so, the Commission announced in its 'Energy and Climate
Change Package', adopted on 10 January 2007, that they are
preparing legislative proposals which aim to establish a regulatory
framework for the capture of CO2 and its geological storage. To this
end an internet consultation was conducted and the legislative
proposals to regulate CCS are expected by the end of 2007. Until the
current law is modified or changed, however, the following provisions
apply.
Before CCS projects are approved two EC Directives require that a
member state government assesses the effects on the environment of
certain plans and programmes. Firstly, the Strategic Environmental
Assessment Directive65 requires that such an assessment is carried out
and subjected to public participation. This must then be taken into
account by decision-makers prior to any authorisation. Secondly, the
Environmental Assessment Directive66 requires that the
environmental impact of projects is assessed and any methods of
mitigating those effects must be evaluated prior to authorisation.
Although CCS projects are not specifically mentioned in the list of
64 Sustainable power generation from fossil fuels: aiming for near-zero emissions from coal
after 2020, COM (2006) 1722}-{SEC(2006) 1723}-{SEC(2007) 12}.
65 Directive 2001/42/EC.
66 Directive 85/337IEEC, as amended by 97/lI/EC.
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categories where a mandatory assessment is to be made, the list does
include all projects connected to the oil and gas sector.
The Capture Phase will largely depend on whether CO2 falls within
the definition of waste or a bi-product but, as the Netherlands Legal
Taskforce stated, CO2 is not considered to be a dangerous substance
as it occurs naturally within oil and gas fields. If the CO2 is used for
enhanced oil recovery then it would be likely to be considered a bi-
product.67 Further EC Directives, which will impact on the capture
phase of CCS projects, are the Habitats Directive, the Water
Framework Directive, the Environmental Liability Directive and the
ED Monitoring Guidelines. The current Marine Bill will also have an
effect once it is in force.
The Norwegian Experience
Being an energy-rich country with a strong environmental ethic,
Norway has a long-standing policy on carbon dioxide capture and
storage. There are currently three major CCS projects within the
Norwegian jurisdiction, with two of which the Norwegian
Government is collaborating, the third being an agreement between
Shell and Statoil to work towards developing the world's largest
project using carbon dioxide for enhanced oil recovery. All of these
projects need government incentives which must be compatible with
ED State Aid guidelines.68 In March 2007 the Norwegian Government
introduced a Bill to Parliament for the establishment of a state-owned
company that will safeguard the national interest in all projects
concerning CO2 capture, transportation and storage as part of a
consortium with industrial partners.
Norway also has extensive experience of using CO2 for enhanced oil
recovery and has been storing CO2 in geological structures since
1996. There is a programme for monitoring all such projects, the data
67 See EC cases - Palin Granit, A/vesta Po/arit, Saetti, Kingdom ofSpain, where it was ruled
that substances other than the primary product of a production process would be a bi-product
and not a waste.
68 See below.
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from which confirms that the CO2 is firmly confined within the
storage reservoir.69 This is in accordance with the Petroleum Act and
the Pollution Control Act 1981, which requires Statoil to monitor the
CO2 storage and report to the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority
annually.70
Liability for Environmental Damage Caused
The most important aspect with regard to CO2 sequestration in the
continental shelf is the liability and compensation for environmental
damage. In Norway the Pollution Control Act has special rules on
liability for environmental damage, based on strict and severe liability
for the operator of the installation or activity that causes the damage.7!
This statute provides for the liability to remain with the operator for
the first two years and thereafter the regulatory body. However, even
if leakage of CO2 from underground deposits into the sea occurs, it is
difficult to see how this can result in a type of damage to public or
private interests that may result in a compensatable loss. The
environmental, health and safety risks, associated with injection of
CO2 into a geologic formation, have been successfully managed for
well over a decade in commercial oil and gas operations.
The UK Perspective
Unlike Norway the UK has been slow to appreciate the potential
benefits of carbon capture and storage. Since the late 1980s studies
had been carried out to use capture of both carbon dioxide and
sulphur dioxide from coal-fired power stations for the purposes of
enhanced oil recovery.72 This work was used for a report to the OTI in
69 'Carbon Capture and Storage', Fact Sheet published on 18 April 2007 by Norwegian
Government at www.regjeringen.no!en!dep!oed!subject!carbon-capture-and-storage!.
70 Pollution Control Act 1981, Ch 7 § 48-49.
71 Pollution Control Act, Ch 8: Compensation for pollution damage, § 53-64.
72 Conference papers and unpublished reports by R S Park and Dr Walski.
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1991.73 Had the then Government designed a policy to require the oil
companies to factor in enhanced oil recovery to their exploitation
programmes, both the regulatory structure and, possibly, the pipelines
would now be in place for the sequestration of CO2 for
storage/disposal purposes.74 However, the current Government now
finds itself in the position of trying to catch up with the current policy
of the EU to support CCS.
In June 2007 the UK Government published a consultation paper on
the decommissioning of offshore installations on the UK continental
shelf (UKCS). The paper was mainly about liability for
decommissioning costs which would need new legislation. However,
the Government lost an opportunity to consider decommissioning
jointly with the concept of carbon capture either for the purposes of
enhanced oil recovery or for storage in depleted oil or gas fields. As
was stated in the report by the North Sea Basin Task Force,75 'without
near-term intervention, the required infrastructure will be removed
and the opportunity for re-use for CCS lost'.
Further, the largest potential source of CO2 in the UK is from the
power generation sector, more particularly, coal fired power plants.
However, the Government has not taken any steps to create incentives
for CO2 emitters to capture CO2. In addition, there is no mention of
CO2 capture and storage in the 'United Kingdom National Emission
Reduction Plan for implementation of the revised Large Combustion
Plants Directive (200 l/80/EC)', published by DEFRA in February
2006. With all three issues being considered within the same time
frame, the opportunity for 'joined up thinking' is evident.
The UK Government should think seriously about requiring coal-fired
power plants to capture CO2 and S02 from flue gases under the
7J Carhon Dioxide Recovery }rom Power Station Flue Gases and its Use to Enhance the
Recovery ofOil (Trichem Consultants).
74 P D Park, Decommissioning of Oil and Gas Installations (unpublished report for
Occidental Oil (UK), 1990).
75 Storing C0 2 under the North Sea Basin, (a report by the North Sea Basin Task Force, June
2007).
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revised Large Combustion Plants Directive and require the operating
oil and gas companies to provide for facilities for enhanced oil
recovery, using either the CO2 or S02, depending on the structure of
the uneconomic field, or to facilitate the storage of these gases in
depleted fields under the new legislation regarding decommissioning
of offshore installations. This would then provide the 'near-term
intervention' required by the North Sea Basin Task Force.
If the UK Government introduced domestic legislation similar to that
in Norway, including a similar liability regime, this would pave the
way for an 80% reduction in UK CO2 emissions. Alternatively,
liability could be addressed in a similar manner to liability for
decommissioning on the UK continental shelf, which could include
the posting of surety bonds, letters of credit, trust funds or
environmental liability insurance. However, operators would possibly
need a finite liability cap. Operators and insurers would need the
ability to predict the costs of their liability as, if liability costs are
significant, organisation and investment decisions may be influenced
by a desire to minimise their costs.
Possible Incentives and 'State Aid'
Both the UK and Norway have recognised the need for a commercial
incentive for large-scale CCS deployment. Any effective protection of
the climate against the effects of greenhouse gas emissions has only
recently become accepted as a goal by society and politicians alike.
This has not, as yet, been translated into practical restrictions on
emissions on the scale needed76 and, therefore, there is no commercial
logic for private enterprise to accept the extra costs involved. This,
then, calls for some kind of incentive which is compatible with the
European rules on State Aid.
Coal-fired power stations will be the primary source of CCS and,
under the Coal Regulation,77 the EU aims to make coal an integral
76 Consider the over allocation of emission credits under the European National Allocation
Plans.
77 Regulation 140/2002.
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part of the sustainable needs of energy security in the twenty-first
century. Even though Article I of the Regulation emphasises that the
rules for the grant of State aid to the coal industry have the aim of
contributing to the restructuring process, aid is to be restricted to,
inter alia, costs of coal for the generation of electricity. Also, to be
compatible with the proper functioning of the common market, aid
may be granted to cover exceptional costs.78 To retrofit coal-fired
power stations in order that they capture the CO2 prior to release into
the atmosphere could be considered an exceptional cost. The
Commission was required to report on the operation of the Coal
Regulation by the end of 2006, with an evaluation of the restructuring
of the coal industry and its effect on the internal market. The report
must also assess how much coal the EU needs as part of the strategy
of sustainable development and energy security. It is expected that
proposals may be included for the amendment of the Coal Regulation
with respect to its application to State aid after January 2008 and this
could well consider the need for set-up costs for the establishment of
a workable CCS sector.
The primary control of state aid in the European Union is set out in
Articles 87-89 of the EC Treaty and exemplifies the balancing of
competing policies, which is carried out, particularly, in the energy
sector. According to the European Commission/9 the principal task of
state aid control is 'to ensure that State intervention does not distort
the competitive situation on the market through subsidies and tax
exemptions' and there is a blanket prohibition under Article 87(1).
However, there are many examples of large amounts of state aid
being granted in the sector under EURATOM and the now expired
European Coal and Steel Convention Treaties (ECSC). Currently, aid
has been channelled to the sector through preferential tariffs and long-
term contracts, and the main situations in which this has been
acceptable are when aid is deemed to be necessary to counterbalance
adverse effects of liberalisation of the energy market or when aid is
granted for the support of renewable and environmentally friendly
78 Coal Regulation, Art 7.
79 XXXIInd Report on Competition Policy 2002,19.
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energy.80 Under Article 87(2) there are a number of automatic
exemptions which may prove helpful to CCS projects, while Article
87(3) lists the forms of aid that may be compatible with the common
market.
In respect of environmental aid the Commission has issued
guidelines81 in an attempt to balance the promotion of environmental
protection with possible negative effects on competition. At both
international and European level the central principle is that the
'polluter pays', which requires that the costs of measures to tackle
pollution are met by those responsible for creating the pollution and
should, in effect, be internalised into their production costs. In the
Guidelines it is the Commission which has the duty to classify any
proposed aid into either investment aid or rules on operating aid.
Although the Guidelines centre on promoting renewable energy, some
of the case law highlights the difficulty of deciding the relationship
between renewable energy promotion, state aids, the internal market
programme and some of the risks involved in balancing potential
conflicting objectives in energy and environmental policy. In
PreussenElecktra AG v Schleswag AG,82 which was about the issue of
state aid, the tension between the aim of locating preferential
treatment for renewable energy within a competitive framework and
the growing support for environmental measures became evident. The
court ruled that a statutory obligation to purchase electricity,
generated from renewable energy sources in Northern Germany, did
not constitute state aid within the meaning of the Treaty merely
because it was imposed by statute.
Under the Guidelines, once it has been established, therefore, that
state aid does exist, it may be permissible if it promotes renewable
energy sources. These may include aid-compensating high investment
costs and aid in line with the rules applicable to energy savings. As
80 Cameron, Competition in Energy Markets, 2nd edn.
RI Community Guidelines on State Aid for environmental protection [200 I] OJ C37/3.
82 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG [2001] ECR 1-2099.
49
TOWARDS A NEW REGULATORY SYSTEM
far as CCS is concerned, the 'high investment costs' would certainly
apply. There have also been a number of state aid decisions by the
Commission, in which Member States have been allowed both
significant and long-term support for the generation of green
electricity. In 2006 the Commission approved a number of schemes
for 'feed in' tariffs for electricity from renewable sources. These
decisions were based on the view that the measures in each different
state did constitute state aid but, under the Guidelines for State Aid
for Environmental Protection,83 aid was permitted for the generation
of electricity up to the difference between the market price and the
generation cost of this type of electricity. If the capture of carbon
from coal-fired power stations were considered to be 'the generation
of green electricity', then support for the 'high investment costs'
would apply. However, the Commission has also assessed aid for the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in a number of ways, the most
relevant one being the National Allocation Plans for the European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme. In the UK the Climate Change
Levy (CCL) also attracted the attention of the Commission.84 Under
this scheme, which the Commission approved, energy-intensive
sectors were offered a rebate of 80% for a period of 10 years to adapt
to the new Kyoto targets, and improve energy efficiency and cut CO2
emissions. In addition, the Commission approved aid for a Slovenian
scheme that grants reductions in CO2 taxation to operators of CHP
installations and companies that enter into voluntary environmental
agreements. 85
Incentives for CCS, State Aid and the ED ETS
In his Report Stern says that, to achieve the necessary CO2 emission
reductions, a disproportionately large share of the burden will have to
83 [2001] OJ C37/3.
84 Case NN 12/2004, [2005] OJ C244/8.
85 Case C44/204, also Commission press release IP/051l517, 'State Aid; Commission closes
formal investigation on C02 taxation system in Slovenia following changes to legislation'.
01/12/2005.
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be borne by the power-generation sector.86 He also states that 'policy
to reduce emissions should be based on three essential elements:
carbon pricing, technology policy, and removal of barriers to
behavioural change' .87
With regard to the energy sector, the first two policy measures are
aimed at influencing the producers, whereas the third is designed to
influence consumers. Stem goes on to state that establishing a price
for GHG emissions is essential 'so that people are faced with the full
social cost of their actions'. 88 As far as very large emitters are
concerned, the advantage of a trading scheme over a tax is that a
trading scheme determines the quantity of emissions in advance and
leaves the market to determine the price, while a tax sets the price in
advance and the market then determines the quantity.
The national allocations of tradable allowances under Phase One of
the ED Emissions Trading Scheme were free and, so, it could be
argued that this may distort competition and interfere with the internal
energy market, as it 'involves an element of State aid that has neither
been formally notified to, nor cleared by, the Commission under the
EC Treaty,.89 The Guidance Notes state that 'the normal State aid
rules will apply', but, so far, the Commission has not taken any
formal decision in respect of the National Allocation Plans and State
aid. However, in Commission press releases90 in 2006 it was stated
that the Commission was investigating the proposed new Danish and
Swedish CO2 tax reductions, based on the State aid rules.
86 Stem Report p xiii.
87 Ibid, P xviii.
88 Ibid.
89 Johnson, 'Free allocations of allowances under EU emissions trading scheme: legal issues',
(2006) 6 Climate Policy 115-36, 132.
90 IP/0611274 and IP/0611525.
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CCS and the ED ETS
The European Union is now committed to a number of targets by
2020. That is an energy efficiency target of 20%, ensuring that 20%
of its primary energy consumption comes from renewable sources,
and encouraging twelve large-scale CCS power plants to be built.
Most forms of renewable energy are not expected to be competitive
within the next decade without some form of continuing subsidies but
CCS coal plants are commercially viable at a carbon price of
€35/tonne.91 To achieve its target of a 20% reduction of GHG
emissions by 2020, the Commission may well have to reduce the level
of the ETS cap again in Phase 3. Should this happen, it is the
assumption of the Deutsche Bank92 that a price of€35/tonne would be
achievable over 2013-20. Given this analysis, then CCS installation
would become more economically attractive over any forms of
renewable energy. In addition, Lewis93 expects that the Commission
will interpret the supplementary criterion,94 governing the use of
credits in the ETS, more strictly beyond 2010 in order to reflect the
increased reliance on the supply side targets for renewable energy and
the construction of CCS plant, by allowing only 45% of each Member
state's effort to be met by the use of Kyoto flexible mechanisms,
compared with 50% during 2008-12. This will mean that the energy
sector will have to assume a larger share of the burden in order that
emissions are reduced significantly by 2050.
Although the Stem Report's analysis and policy prescnptIOns are
intended for a global audience, Stem also has more specific
recommendations for the EU and the ETS. He is particularly
91 Mark Lewis (Director of Research), Carbon Emissions: Banking on Higher Prices
(Deutsche Bank, 23 July 2007).
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 The principle of supplementarity is enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol and mandates that all
states that have ratified Kyoto must ensure that any use they make of the flexible mechanisms
in order to achieve their targets is supplementary to domestic action.
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concerned with the ETS framework for Phase three in this respect. He
considers that 'decisions made now for Phase three provide an
opportunity for the scheme to influence, and become the nucleus of
future global carbon markets'.
Auctioning ED Allowances to Support CCS
Under phase one of the EU ETS the allowances were allocated to the
Member states on a 'grandfathering' basis.95 Under phase two,
Member states were able to auction up to 10% of the allowances. At a
meeting with UK Trade and Investment, Lewis suggested that, if
more than 10% were auctioned, the money raised could be
hypothecated to encourage an accelerated deployment of renewables,
including CCS.96 The repost from the Chair of the discussion group97
was that this was not possible. However, a closer inspection is
needed. Firstly, under the UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading
Scheme in its original manifestation, the allocations were auctioned.98
Under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme during the second phase,
10% of the allowances are permitted to be auctioned. Therefore, there
is nothing new in auctioning the allowances. It would take only a
small move in policy to allow for a greater proportion of allowances
to be auctioned in order to change behaviour. Although, as the Chair
stated, there is no tradition of hypothecation of revenue in the UK, it
is not without precedent. The UK Landfill tax is hypothecated to
support environmental projects within three miles of the landfill sites.
The electorate voted to support in 2001 a government that increased
national insurance contributions on the understanding that the extra
monies were to be spent on the National Health Service. If only the
allowances for the energy sector were auctioned from the beginning
of Phase three, it is estimated that proceeds to the public purse across
95 Industrial sectors were allocated allowances on their historical emissions.
96 Meeting at Church House, 5 June 2007.
97 Anthony Hobley, Partner, Norton Rose.
98 Patricia Park, 'The UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme: A brave new world or
the result of hurried thinking', (2001) 13(6) Environmental Law & Management 292-299.
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the EU would be €27 billion per annum. 99 Should allowances for all
sectors be auctioned, then this would raise an estimated €60 billion
per annum. IOO With such large numbers involved, this suggestion
deserves further investigation in order to provide incentives for
commercial companies to sign up for further research and
development into clean coal technology, including CCS, and
renewable energy sources.
Conclusions
The decision of the arbitration panel in the Trail Smelter case to use
negotiated regulation of states' activities at the international level was
for some an undermining of state sovereignty but the decision
established an important principle that no state has the right to permit
the use of its territory to cause injury to others. This led to a
negotiated regulatory agreement. The Montreal Protocol took this a
step further by regulating the production of, and trade in, specific
substances, with their eventual phasing out under command and
control. This was relatively successful as regulation of the production
of particular substances from known sources within a particular
industrial sector could be monitored and enforced with the aim of
eventual elimination. The problem came when the Framework
Convention on Climate Change aimed to merely stabilise greenhouse
gases which were produced from a number of disparate sources that
were hard to monitor and enforce. The international community
moved to a 'market based system', provided for in the Kyoto
Protocol, to encourage these disparate sources to consider that there
was a 'business case' for reducing their emissions at least cost to
themselves.
In the study of one particular flexible mechanism which uses 'sinks',
the Stem Review argues that, to achieve the reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions required to prevent global average temperature rising
by more than 2°C, public policy measures that accelerate the
99 Deutsche Bank, Environmental Carbon Emissions, 23 July 2007.
100 Ibid.
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deployment of low-carbon energy sources will be required. He states
that the key to reducing emissions to meet the targeted levels of
greenhouse gas concentrations is 'the deve10f<ment and deployment of
a wide range of low carbon technologies'. 01 He also says that 'in
some sectors - particularly electricity generation, where new
technologies can struggle to gain a foothold - policies to support the
market for early-stage technologies will be critical.' 102
If carbon capture and storage is to form part of the future of our
energy and climate change policy, then Governments need to press for
international and European agreement on a framework for the
recognition and regulation of carbon capture and storage and to bring
forward early proposals for a long-term storage monitoring, safety
and liability regime. 103 No commercial organisation will commit to
this activity without a positive Government policy statement and
some form of incentive, which brings into question the issue of
European State aid rules and the internal market.
The attempts of the Commission to balance the need for
environmental protection and the protection of the internal market
through the State aid rules have led to some interesting results
inasmuch as it has shown considerable reluctance to take action under
the State aid rules against any of the National Allocation Plans, in
spite of some evidence of incompatibility. However, the application
of state aid controls in the energy sector have become clearer and
more predictable over the last few years through the Guidelines on
state aid to environmental protection, especially, with regard to aid for
renewable energy and eligible investment and costs.
The over-allocation of allowances in the first phase of the ED ETS led
to a marked drop in the price for credits. However, given a more
restricted allocation under phases II and III, the Deusche Bank
101 Stem Report, p xix.
102 Stem Report, p xx.
103 Three joint industry projects have been set up by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) to develop
industry guidelines and standards for capture, transmission and storage of carbon dioxide.
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predicts an eventual carbon price of €35. In addition, as long as a
developed scheme to auction allowances under the National
Allocation Plans for the ED Emissions Trading Scheme Phase three is
in compliance with the state aid rules, then the hypothecated revenue
raised could provide incentives for commercial organisations to
engage in research and development to realise an economically viable
carbon capture and storage regime.
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